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AGENCY 
Creation of agency 
3.1 The question whether a wife was, merely by virtue of the 
marital relationship, an agent of her husband was considered in Ng Hock 
Kon v Sembawang Capital Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 307. The issue arose in 
the context of an attempt by a creditor to enforce a mortgage. Ng owed 
Sembawang Capital some $4m. He agreed to repay the outstanding 
amount by an instalment plan detailed in a deed of arrangement 
(“Deed”). In addition, he granted, pursuant to the Deed, a mortgage 
over his property for the purposes of securing his liabilities. The Deed 
provided for full payment of all outstanding sums to be accelerated 
upon the occurrence of stipulated events of default (including the 
failure to make payment of an instalment in a timely manner), provided 
Sembawang Capital gave Ng two weeks’ notice in writing to rectify the 
default. Ng did default on his instalment payments. The notice of 
default was, however, given to Ng’s wife, Yu, and not Ng, who was 
apparently in hospital at that time. Ng failed to rectify his default and 
Sembawang Capital sought to terminate the Deed and exercise its rights 
as mortgagee. Attempts by Ng to get Sembawang Capital to forgive his 
defaults were unsuccessful and proceedings were initiated by the latter 
for possession against Ng. 
3.2 A central issue before the court in Ng Hock Kon v Sembawang 
Capital Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 307 was whether there was proper service 
of the notice of default. On the evidence, Yu had accepted and 
acknowledged receipt of the notice at a meeting with Sembawang 
Capital which she had requested in order to discuss Ng’s liabilities under 
the Deed. The trial judge was of the view that the handing of the notice 
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to and its receipt by Yu at this meeting constituted delivery of the notice 
to Ng, as the former had received the same as Ng’s agent. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal disagreed with the judge. V K Rajah JA, who delivered 
the judgment of the court, stated that the evidence merely constituted 
Yu an agent of Ng for the limited purpose of negotiating a possible 
settlement with Sembawang Capital. As the notice of default had 
significant legal consequences, the court was of the view that cogent 
evidence was needed before it could be concluded that Yu was 
authorised to receive the notice on Ng’s behalf. The fact that Yu was Ng’s 
wife did not give rise to any presumption that she was Ng’s agent, and 
did not justify any assumption that authority had been expressly or 
impliedly conferred on Yu to accept service of the notice of default on 
Ng’s behalf. 
3.3 In Yuen Chow Hin v ERA Realty Network Pte Ltd [2009] 
2 SLR(R) 786 (see also “Duties of the agent” at para 3.11 below), 
a property agent was held an agent of the housing agency under whose 
name and banner the former operated even though the agreement 
between them expressly declared that nothing in the agreement was to 
“constitute or create a partnership or employment” between them. ERA 
was sued, for breach of contract, by a couple who had employed the 
services of one Ang in the sale of their flat. Ang was a property agent 
who worked as a subordinate to one Mike, both of whom used ERA’s 
name and logo. It was the plaintiffs’ case that, as a result of Ang’s and 
Mike’s misconduct, they had failed to obtain the best price for their flat. 
This, argued the plaintiffs, was a breach of the implied term that ERA 
would use its best endeavours to obtain the best price for the plaintiffs. 
It was ERA’s defence that Ang, and his superior, Mike, were independent 
contractors whose conduct did not bind them. Choo Han Teck J 
rejected the defence. Ang had used ERA’s name and logo in his dealings 
with the plaintiffs, and there was a commission-sharing arrangement 
between ERA, Mike and all the property agents operating under Mike 
(including Ang). His Honour was therefore of the view that the 
relationship between the parties was one of agency and that ERA must 
bear responsibility for the conduct of Ang and Mike. 
3.4 In Ng Eng Ghee v Mamata Kapildev Dave [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109 
(see also “Duties of the agent” at para 3.13 below), a sale committee 
(“SC”) appointed in a collective sale of the strata units in a 
condominium housing development was held the agent of all the 
subsidiary proprietors collectively. The case involved the collective sale 
of the leasehold condominium, Horizon Towers. The SC was appointed 
at an extraordinary general meeting of the subsidiary proprietors, which 
launched the formal collective sale process. A collective sale agreement 
signed subsequently by the consenting subsidiary proprietors ratified 
the appointment of the SC and provided that the SC “shall be the agents 
of the Consenting Subsidiary Proprietors for the purpose of negotiating 
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and finalising the Collective Sale”. The Court of Appeal held that as the 
SC was the agent of the proprietors collectively, there was no point at 
which the SC could act solely in the interests of any group of subsidiary 
proprietors, consenting or otherwise. The court observed that the SC’s 
role was one of an “impartial agent” acting for both consenting and 
objecting proprietors, and it must therefore “hold an even hand” 
between these differentiated interests (at [107]). As for the validity of 
the provision in the collective sale agreement, the court deferred 
comment but raised the possibility that the provision could be null and 
void as being repugnant to the duty of the SC as agent for all the 
subsidiary proprietors (at [116]). 
Implied authority 
3.5 In DBS Vickers Securities (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Chin Pang Joo 
[2009] SGHC 248, the court had to consider whether, on the facts, 
actual authority could be implied from the conduct of the alleged 
principal. The plaintiff, DBSV, was claiming against Chin in respect of 
contra losses incurred on Chin’s securities trading account and interest 
thereon. Instructions for trades on Chin’s account were given by one 
Tang to DBSV’s remisier, Tay. Chin disputed the trades done on his 
account, claiming that he did not appoint Tang as his agent with the 
authority to trade on his account. Indeed, Chin had not signed DBSV’s 
mandate to confer authority on any other person to trade on his 
account. The court, however, found sufficient evidence of a continuing 
arrangement between Chin and Tang that constituted Chin’s 
conferment of implied authority on Tang to trade on the former’s DBSV 
account. The following findings of fact supported the court’s conclusion 
(at [20]–[21]): 
(a) Chin had given Tang the authority and discretion to 
trade on his behalf on his other trading accounts; 
(b) Chin had settled the trading losses incurred on another 
trading account even though he similarly did not sign any 
mandate authorising Tang to trade in respect of that account; 
(c) Chin had given Tang his internet trading passwords to a 
number of other trading accounts; and 
(d) Chin had received DBSV’s contract notes and 
statements, as well as statements from the Central Depository 
(Pte) Ltd (“CDP”) in respect of the relevant trades and did not 
query the same. 
3.6 The court observed in addition that by his admission that he 
had received DBSV’s and CDP’s statements coupled with his failure at 
any material time to object to DBSV in respect of the trades reported in 
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those statements, Chin could also be said to have held out to DBSV that 
Tang was authorised to trade on Chin’s account (at [28]). Liability on 
the basis of apparent authority could thus also be made out. 
Holding out and apparent authority 
3.7 In Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v 
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788, the court 
had to consider whether the defendant company (“APBS”) was bound 
by the fraudulent acts of its “finance manager”. Chia, the finance 
manager, managed to obtain credit and loan facilities purportedly for 
the company’s purposes, from the plaintiff banks, by providing the latter 
with forged documents, including forged copies of board resolutions. 
The banks claimed against the company for the repayment of these 
sums on the basis that Chia had actual or ostensible authority to enter 
into the relevant transactions on APBS’s behalf. 
3.8 On the issue of actual authority, the plaintiffs placed reliance on 
a couple of APBS documents which described the job scope for the 
position of “finance manager” and the company’s treasury policy. The 
court, however, held that these documents did not assist the plaintiffs’ 
case. Specifically, Belinda Ang J held that Chia’s fraud on APBS was 
necessarily determinative of the issue as “Chia’s actual authority (express 
or implied), if any, is impliedly subject to a condition that it is to be 
exercised honestly and on behalf of the principal” (Skandinaviska 
Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [46]). Thus, even if Chia was 
actually authorised to transact on APBS’s behalf, his fraud took the 
transactions out of the scope of any grant of actual authority. With this 
holding, the plaintiffs’ further assertion that Chia also had the implied 
actual authority to represent the authenticity of the forged documents 
was therefore untenable. 
3.9 Interestingly, the court, in the resolution of this issue of actual 
authority, placed particular emphasis on the plaintiffs’ requirement, 
before granting the credit facilities, for the provision of certified extracts 
of relevant board resolutions authorising the entry into the transactions. 
Of this cautionary requirement, Ang J stated (Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [69]): 
From this standard requirement, it is … plain that Chia as Finance 
Manager did not have actual authority (express or implied) to open 
bank accounts or borrow on behalf of [APBS] unless so empowered 
by the board. 
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3.10 Ang J then proceeded to consider whether APBS was 
nonetheless bound by Chia’s acts by the operation of the doctrine of 
apparent authority. Her Honour affirmed the need for the plaintiffs  
to establish the four factors stipulated by Diplock LJ in Freeman & 
Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 
(Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia 
Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [80]). 
Dealing with the requirement for a representation by the principal that 
the agent had the authority to enter on, the principal’s behalf, into a 
transaction of the kind sought to be enforced, her Honour held, on the 
evidence, that APBS was not estopped from denying the forgery as there 
had been no representation as to Chia’s authority by APBS (at [102]). 
Chia’s appointment to the position of finance manager of itself was of 
little assistance to the plaintiffs unless there was evidence of the sort of 
matters such a finance manager was usually authorised to do. Further, 
the plaintiffs’ standard requirement for certified extracts of the 
authorising board resolutions meant that they did not rely on Chia’s 
appearance of authority. On the evidence, the court found that the 
plaintiffs had willingly assumed the risk of Chia’s lack of authority. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that Chia had neither actual nor 
ostensible authority to bind APBS and the plaintiffs’ claims in contract 
were therefore dismissed (at [171]). 
Duties of the agent 
3.11 In Yuen Chow Hin v ERA Realty Network Pte Ltd [2009] 
2 SLR(R) 786 (see also “Creation of Agency” at para 3.3 above), Choo 
Han Teck J held that when a property agent was engaged to sell or buy 
real property, he was thereby an agent (in the legal sense) of the person 
who engaged him. This subjected the agent to fiduciary obligations 
which obliged the agent to act only in his principal’s interests, and 
prohibited the agent from acting in his own interests or in the interests 
of persons other than his principal. The case involved a property agent 
who was engaged to sell a flat by the plaintiffs. The property agent did 
not disclose to the sellers that the purchaser was in fact the wife of his 
superior, Mike. The flat was then almost immediately sold at a 
significantly higher price, reaping Mike a tidy profit. This, the court 
held, created a conflict of interest between the sellers and the agent, and 
was in breach of the agent’s fiduciary duties. In his Honour’s words 
(at [13]): When a person has been appointed an agent of another, he 
becomes an extension of that other and so far as his endeavours are for 
the benefit of his principal he cannot create benefits for himself or his 
friends without due disclosure … The relationship that an agent has 
with his principal is fiduciary in nature; that is to say, it is one founded 
in trust. When a farmer negotiates with the fox on behalf of the chicken 
for its safe passage the farmer cannot have a personal interest in the deal 
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or the chicken might be doomed for it has given its trust to the farmer 
and placed its safety in his hands.” 
3.12 The case of Areco International Pte Ltd v Lam Cheng Yee [2009] 
SGHC 9 also involved an estate agent accused of wrongdoing for 
allegedly being less than forthcoming in her replies to the vendor with 
regard to certain information about the purchaser of the property. 
Specifically, the vendor argued that the agent ought to have disclosed the 
fact that the purchaser was the owner of the property adjacent to the 
one being sold. The vendor claimed that the failure to so disclose led to 
her losing the opportunity to obtain a higher price for the property. The 
court, however, rejected the claim as no evidence had been adduced to 
show that the agent owed the vendor any duty to disclose the identity of 
the purchaser. 
3.13 The duties imposed on a collective sale committee (“SC”) 
appointed in a collective sale of the strata units in a condominium 
housing development were considered at length in Ng Eng Ghee v 
Mamata Kapildev Dave [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109 (see also “Creation of 
Agency” at para 3.4 above). The Court of Appeal held that, as an agent 
of all the subsidiary proprietors, the SC owed fiduciary obligations to 
these subsidiary proprietors. In the peculiar context of a collective sale, 
standards of accountability and conduct more exacting than those 
expected of ordinary agents must be imposed on the SC. This is because 
collective sales are subject to a statutory scheme which, subject to there 
being a qualifying majority who consent, allows the sale of strata units 
in spite of their owners’ objections. In addition, an inherent inclination 
on the part of the SC to achieve a sale existed as members of the SC were 
likely to be themselves part of the consenting majority. This placed the 
objecting subsidiary proprietors in an especially vulnerable position. 
The court examined the nature of the relationship between the SC and 
the subsidiary proprietors and concluded that the SC owed obligations 
which were akin to those of a trustee with a power of sale. Thus, the SC’s 
duties qua agent, fiduciary and trustee of the power of sale included, 
inter alia, (a) the duty of loyalty or fidelity; (b) the duty of even-
handedness; (c) the duty to avoid any conflict of interest; (d) the duty to 
make full disclosure of relevant information; and (e) the duty to act 
with conscientiousness (at [134]–[169]). 
3.14 In Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737, 
the Court of Appeal opined (at [40]) that an agency relationship did not 
always give rise to a fiduciary duty. The presumption that a fiduciary 
relationship existed in many types of agency relationships could be 
rebutted by the peculiar facts of each case. In addition, the court 
observed that the extent of any existing fiduciary duty might vary 
depending on the particular fact situation. 
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PARTNERSHIP LAW 
3.15 In the field of partnership law, the year under review was 
perhaps more noteworthy for legislative rather than judicial 
developments: the coming into force of the Limited Partnerships Act 
introduced a variation on the ordinary partnership, based largely on the 
model first adopted in the UK a century earlier. Like a partnership (but 
unlike the limited liability partnership introduced in 2005), the limited 
partnership does not have legal personality and is subject to the general 
law of partnership. On the other hand, the High Court had to decide 
only a few cases, and the Court of Appeal none, which raised 
partnership law issues of interest. 
Relationship of partners to third parties 
3.16 In Orix Capital Ltd v Estate of Lim Chor Pee [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 1062, the liability to a third party creditor of both a “salaried 
partner” and a former ostensible partner was in question. The facts 
involved the fairly common practice of a law firm leasing its 
photocopiers from a leasing company. The firm, Chor Pee & Partners, 
originally took a lease of Canon-manufactured copiers from Newcourt, 
a company specialising in leasing out office equipment. In August 2004, 
the plaintiff, Orix, offered to replace the Newcourt lease with a new 
arrangement on more favourable terms. This arrangement involved a 
four-way deal whereby Canon paid off the substantial early-termination 
payment due to Newcourt under its lease, that payment being 
reimbursed by Orix to Canon and, in effect, added to the sums payable 
under the new Orix lease. The Orix lease was signed by the firm’s 
principal, Lim Chor Pee (“LCP”) and by his son Marc Lim (“Marc”) 
who was a salaried partner; it also named, but was not signed by, 
Rebecca Yeo (“Rebecca”), who had been practising with the firm under a 
profit-sharing arrangement since 2003. In July 2005, the firm failed to 
make rental payments, and Orix gave notice of termination of the lease. 
Following a request by LCP, in August 2005, Orix wrote to the 
defendants offering to “reinstate the lease” on condition of payment of 
the arrears and certain other amounts, which were duly paid. A further 
default occurred in 2007 and Orix terminated the agreement and 
brought proceedings for breach of contract. Liability was not contested 
by the estate of LCP (who had died in the meantime) but was denied by 
Marc and Rebecca. 
3.17 An important preliminary question was whether the 
August 2005 agreement putatively “reinstating” the lease did have that 
effect in law or whether it amounted to a new agreement. Judith 
Prakash J held that Orix’s termination of the lease had the effect of 
discharging it so that the agreement in August 2005 amounted to a fresh 
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agreement on slightly different terms from the original lease. The judge 
also dismissed various arguments that the lease, and consequently the 
August 2005 agreement, were a sham or an unconscionable bargain or 
procured by misrepresentation, or were void under the Moneylenders 
Act (Cap 188, 1985 Rev Ed); these issues are beyond the scope of this 
chapter (see chapter 11 of this issue). 
3.18 The claim against Marc was based on his status as a salaried 
partner; ie, that he held himself out as a partner even though he did not, 
within the firm, share profits and losses and therefore was not a true 
partner. Liability of a person held out as a partner arises at common law 
and under s 14 of the Partnership Act (Cap 391, 1994 Rev Ed), both of 
which require reliance by the plaintiff on the holding out. The court 
considered that the fact that Marc appeared in the Law Society’s records 
as a partner in the firm was sufficient holding out. Orix’s search of those 
records before the lease was entered enabled it to rely on this holding 
out, clearly distinguishing the case from Nationwide Building Society v 
Lewis [1998] Ch 482. That case, accepted by Prakash J as correct, held 
that reliance could not be presumed and had not been proven as 
Nationwide was unaware of the salaried partner’s existence when it dealt 
with the firm. In addition, here the firm’s manager had confirmed that 
Marc was a partner to the Canon representative arranging the lease 
transaction who had passed it on to Orix. Thus, it was unnecessary for 
Orix to have independently verified Marc’s status with the firm. And 
although Orix’s claim was treated as made under the August 2005 
agreement rather than the original lease, there had been no change in 
Marc’s status as at August 2005; LCP’s actions in requesting 
reinstatement of the lease were within the latter’s authority and so 
bound the firm and, by extension, Marc. (See Orix Capital Ltd v Estate of 
Lim Chor Pee [2009] 4 SLR(R) 1062 at [42]–[45].) 
3.19 The claim against Rebecca was more complicated. As she did 
share profits, albeit only on the files on which she worked, there was an 
argument that she was in law a (true) partner. However, Prakash J 
rejected this conclusion (with respect, correctly so) on the basis that 
there was no common intention for her to be a partner, despite her 
participation in some profits: she had no say in the management of the 
firm or access to its accounts, nor did she share in its assets and 
liabilities. Nevertheless, liability on the basis of holding out was 
applicable to her, at least in respect of the 2004 lease. Like Marc, her 
status had been confirmed to Orix via the Canon representative, and she 
was named as a partner in the lease itself. The reliance requirement was 
thus also fulfilled. (See Orix Capital Ltd v Estate of Lim Chor Pee [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 1062 at [95]–[99].) 
3.20 Although not a signatory to (or indeed aware of) the lease, 
Rebecca would be liable on it “as a partner” so long as it fell within 
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LCP’s implied authority, eg, under s 5 of the Partnership Act (Cap 391, 
1994 Rev Ed). She argued that it exceeded his authority as it was not 
entered “in the usual way” in the course of the firm’s business because 
the amounts due under it included sums equating to the substantial 
early-termination payment made by Canon to Newcourt. This amount 
was in fact a multiple of the value of the copiers themselves, and the 
judge was clearly troubled by the fact that Rebecca would not have been 
liable on the actual payment due to Newcourt since it arose before she 
joined the firm. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the lease was 
entered in the ordinary course of business, on the basis that the 
procurement of photocopiers was part of a law firm’s business and there 
was evidence that both Orix and the firm regarded the transaction as 
being usual. (See Orix Capital Ltd v Estate of Lim Chor Pee [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 1062 at [100]–[104].). 
3.21 However, while Rebecca would thus have been liable on the 
original lease, the plaintiff ’s claim ultimately depended on the 
replacement agreement entered in August 2005, shortly before which 
Rebecca had ceased to be involved with the firm. The judge accepted 
that she did not know of, much less consent to be bound by, that 
agreement, so her liability if any must arise from some prior authority 
given by or attributable to her. As Rebecca had ceased to be a partner at 
the latest by the end of July 2005, any actual authority given by her to 
LCP would have ceased at that point and, it was held, LCP had not 
thereafter represented her to be a partner. Orix, therefore, argued that 
s 36 of the Partnership Act (Cap 391, 1994 Rev Ed) applied, which 
requires an outgoing partner to give actual notice of her retirement to 
existing creditors of the firm; no such notice had been given. This was 
rejected, in part on the basis that s 36 does not apply to salaried (as 
opposed to true) partners, although there was little discussion of this 
interesting question (Orix Capital Ltd v Estate of Lim Chor Pee [2009] 
4 SLR(R) 1062 at [111]). Alternatively, the judge opined that Orix 
entered into the August 2005 agreement only with LCP and those whom 
he then represented, which did not include Rebecca (at [111]). But 
(assuming for the moment that s 36 does apply to salaried partners), 
with respect, it is somewhat difficult to see how Rebecca’s withdrawal of 
her authority was relevant where it was not notified to existing creditors 
who had been aware of her involvement with the firm. After all, s 36 is 
based on the underlying principle that existing creditors may assume 
that there has been no change in the firm until told otherwise. In the 
result, however, Rebecca was held not liable to the plaintiff. 
3.22 In Faber Image Media Pte Ltd v Patrician Holdings Pte Ltd [2009] 
SGHC 16, an issue also arose under s 36 of the Partnership Act 
(Cap 391, 1994 Rev Ed). Patrician Holdings Pte Ltd (“Patrician”) and 
Rajeev had formed a partnership to operate restaurants and pubs. The 
partnership, which had leased pub premises from a landlord until 
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31 December 2006, had sub-leased part of the premises to the plaintiff 
company until the same date. In March 2006, Rajeev withdrew from the 
partnership, which was de-registered under the Business Registration 
Act (Cap 32, 2004 Rev Ed) in September 2006. A new company (in 
which Rajeev was a shareholder and director) was established by 
Patrician as intended successor to the partnership. In September 2006, 
the plaintiff notified the exercise of its right to renew the sub-lease. 
However, when the landlord became aware of the partnership’s demise 
and the “succession” by the new company, it terminated the main lease 
for breach of contract, and the plaintiff eventually vacated the 
sub-premises. The main question for determination was whether the 
partnership was in breach of its obligation to renew the sub-lease; the 
court held that it was not because the plaintiff had during negotiations 
actually withdrawn its renewal notice. But the judge went on to consider 
whether, had the partnership been found liable, Rajeev would have been 
liable despite his retirement before the date of the assumed breach. 
3.23 The partnership law issue was, therefore, whether the plaintiff 
had received sufficient notice of Rajeev’s withdrawal from the 
partnership, so as to negate any liability of Rajeev that might have arisen 
under s 36(1) of the Partnership Act (Cap 391, 1994 Rev Ed). The court 
held that, although formal notice had not been given (and was 
unnecessary), on the evidence, it was likely that the plaintiff had been 
told of Rajeev’s retirement (Faber Image Media Pte Ltd v Patrician 
Holdings Pte Ltd [2009] SGHC 16 at [84]). After March 2006, the 
plaintiff had dealt with one Ramu as representative of the partnership 
and not with Rajeev, who had not thereafter been seen by the plaintiff 
on the premises. Its failure to question Ramu’s status implied that the 
plaintiff knew Ramu had stepped into Rajeev’s shoes. Even so, it is 
submitted that this finding should not be treated as imposing the 
burden of proving lack of notice under s 36(1) on the creditor. 
Relationship of partners between themselves 
3.24 Poh Lian Development Pte Ltd v Hok Mee Property Pte Ltd [2009] 
SGHC 153 illustrates the fiduciary duty of good faith owed by each 
partner to his co-partners. The law was straightforward: what was 
notable about the case was the fact that all the partners were held to be 
in breach of their fiduciary and/or contractual duties, giving rise to a 
complicated quantification and set-off exercise of the damages and 
accountable sums owing. 
3.25 The partnership was established between a property developer, 
a construction company and a Buddhist temple (a registered society) to 
develop a columbarium. Expecting a huge profit from the project, all the 
partners took advantage (with varying degrees of culpability, according 
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to Lee Seiu Kin J) of opportunities to benefit themselves. The various 
breaches included: secretly procuring sham bids in the construction 
contract tender; procuring over-payments for building materials to a 
partner’s related company; failing to account for sales proceeds; and 
using partnership funds to make loans (not repaid) to directors of a 
partner. 
Capacity to be a partner 
3.26 Finally, although (with respect) not a decision of great 
importance to the law of partnership, one cannot part from 2009 
without noting the Dickens-worthy facts of Kor Beng Shien v Lee Poh Lee 
[2009] SGHC 267. In that case, the defendant, Lee Poh Lee, purported to 
enter into a partnership with Ko Him Kock some three hours after the 
death of the latter. Unsurprisingly, Tan Lee Meng J had no difficulty in 
finding that no partnership had been created notwithstanding 
registration of the “firm” under the Business Registration Act (Cap 32, 
2004 Rev Ed) (or, one might add, the fact that it took place during the 
seventh lunar month). 
